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Abstract We develop a demographic macroeconomic model that captures the salient
life-cycle features at the individual level and, at the same time, allows us to pinpoint the
main mechanisms at play at the aggregate level. At the individual level the model fea-
tures both age-dependent mortality and productivity and allows for less-than-perfect
annuity markets. At the aggregate level the model gives rise to single-sector endog-
enous growth and includes a Pay-As-You-Go pension system. We show that ageing
generally promotes economic growth due to a strong savings response. Under a defined
benefit system the growth effect is still positive but lower than under a defined con-
tribution system. Surprisingly, we find that an increase in the retirement age dampens
the economic growth expansion following a longevity shock.
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1 Introduction
In contrast to its Keynesian counterpart, neoclassical macroeconomics prides itself that
it is rigorously derived from solid microeconomic foundations. Indeed, the canonical
neoclassical macro model is typically based on the aggregate behaviour of infinitely-
lived rational agents maximizing their life-time utility. But, really, how micro-founded
are these models? Is it proper to suppose that the aggregate economy acts as though it
were one agent? Is it proper to assume that individuals live forever? The commonplace
reaction to these questions is, of course, to ignore them under the Friedman norm that
if the model is able to replicate reality then it must be fine.
The neoclassical model, however, is not able to replicate reality. This simple obser-
vation induced a long line of research trying to incorporate features into large mac-
roeconomic models that would bring them closer to reality. To no avail it seems, for
Sims (1980) went so far as to argue that macroeconomics is so out of touch with
reality that a simple “measurement without theory” approach seemed to outperform
the most sophisticated models. Measurement without theory, however, also implies
outcomes without policy implications. For the mechanisms at play remain hidden from
view.
In a seminal contribution Blanchard (1985) introduced the most basic of human
features into an otherwise standard macroeconomic model and came to a surprising
conclusion. If non-altruistic individuals are finitely lived, then one of the key theo-
rems of neoclassical thought—the Ricardian equivalence theorem—no longer holds.
Innovative as it was, the Blanchard model still suffers from serious shortcomings.
For instance, it assumes that individuals have a mortality rate that is independent of
their age. That is, a 10-year old child and a 969-year old Methuselah have the same
probability of dying (indeed in Blanchard’s model there is not even an upper limit for
the age of individuals). Furthermore, it assumes that perfect life-insurance markets
exist so that, from the point of view of the individual, mortality hardly matters much
at all.
In reaction to Blanchard’s analysis, a huge body of literature evolved introducing
additional features aimed at improving the description of the life-cycle behaviour of
the individual who stands at the core of the model. As computing power became more
readily available, the so-called computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach was
close to follow.1 The outward shift in the computational technology frontier made
ever more complex models feasible but Sims (1980) critique seemed to have had a
short echo for within foreseeable time these models had again become so complex that
the mechanisms translating microeconomic behaviour into macroeconomic outcomes
were lost in aggregation and details of the solution algorithm.
The challenge thus remains to construct macroeconomic models that, on the one
hand, are solidly founded in the microeconomic environment of the individual agent
and, on the other hand, are able to show to the analyst which main mechanisms are at
play. In this paper we contribute our part to this challenge. That is, we construct a trac-
table macroeconomic model that can replicate basic facts of the individual life-cycle
1 The classic reference in this area is Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). For a recent survey of stochastic CGE
overlapping generations models, see Fehr (2009).
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and, at the same time, clearly shows which mechanisms drive the two-way interaction
between microeconomic behaviour and macroeconomic outcomes.
The advantage of our approach over the Blanchard (1985) framework is that we
can replicate the most important life-cycle choices that an individual makes. In earlier
work (Heijdra and Mierau 2009) we show that conclusions concerning credit market
imperfections may be grossly out of line if such life-cycle features are ignored. The
advantage of our approach over the CGE framework is that we retain the flexibility
necessary to analyze which factors are driving the relationship between individuals and
their macroeconomic environment. Although CGE models can account for numerous
institutional traits that are beyond our model, such models fare worse at identifying
which mechanisms are at play.
In order to incorporate longevity risk in our model we make use of the demographic
macroeconomic framework developed in Heijdra and Romp (2008) and Heijdra and
Mierau (2009, 2010).2 We assume that annuity markets are imperfect. This leads indi-
viduals to discount future felicity by their mortality rate which is increasing in age.
Hence, individuals have a hump-shaped consumption profile over their life-cycle. The
empirically observed hump-shaped consumption profile for individuals is further stud-
ied for the Netherlands by Alessie and de Ree (2009). In contrast to our earlier work
we assume that labour supply and the retirement age are exogenous.
At the aggregate level our model builds on the insights of Romer (1989) and postu-
lates the existence of strong inter-firm investment externalities. These externalities act
as the engine behind the endogenous growth mechanism. Furthermore, we introduce
a government pension system in order to study the role of institutional arrangements
on the relationship between ageing and economic growth. In particular we study a
Pay-As-You-Go system that may be either financed on a defined benefit or a defined
contribution basis. In addition the government may use the retirement age as a policy
variable.
We use this model to study how ageing relates to economic growth and what role
there is for government policy. We find that, in principle, ageing is good for eco-
nomic growth because it increases the incentive for individuals to save. However, if
a defined benefit system is in place the higher contributions necessary to finance the
additional pensioners will reduce individual savings and thereby dampen the growth
increase following a longevity shock. In order to circumvent this reduction in growth
the government could opt to introduce a defined contribution system in which the
benefits are adjusted downward to accommodate the increased dependency ratio. Sur-
prisingly, we find that if the government increases the retirement age such that the old
age dependency ratio remains constant economic growth drops compared to both the
defined benefit and the defined contribution system. This is due to an adverse savings
effect following from the shortened retirement period. We study the robustness of
our results to accommodate different assumptions concerning future mortality and we
allow for a broader definition of the pension system that also incorporates health care
costs.
2 In addition to the above mentioned references important recent contributions to the field of demographic
macroeconomics have been, inter alia, by Boucekkine et al. (2002) and d’Albis (2007).
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The remainder of the paper is set-up as follows. The next Section introduces the
model and discusses how we feed in a realistic life-cycle. Section 3 analyses the steady-
state consequences of ageing and provides some policy recommendations. Section 4
concludes.
2 Model
Our model makes use of the insights developed in Heijdra and Mierau (2009, 2010).
We extend our earlier analysis by incorporating a simple PAYG pension system but
we simplify it by assuming that labour supply and the retirement age are exogenous.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the main features of the model. For details
the interested reader is referred to our earlier papers.
On the production side the model features inter-firm externalities which constitute
the foundation for the endogenous growth mechanism. On the consumption side, the
model features age-dependent mortality and labour productivity and allows for imper-
fections in the annuity market. In combination, these features ensure that the model can
capture realistic life-cycle aspects of the consumer-worker’s behaviour. Throughout
the paper we restrict attention to the steady-state.
2.1 Firms
The production side of the model makes use of the insights of Romer (1989, pp. 89–90)
and postulates the existence of sufficiently strong external effects operating between
private firms in the economy. There is a large and fixed number, N , of identical,
perfectly competitive firms. The technology available to firm i is given by:
Yi (t) = (t) Ki (t)ε Ni (t)1−ε , 0 < ε < 1, (1)
where Yi (t) is output, Ki (t) is capital use, Ni (t) is the labour input in efficiency units,
and (t) represents the general level of factor productivity which is taken as given
by individual firms. The competitive firm hires factors of production according to the
following marginal productivity conditions:
w (t) = (1 − ε) (t) κi (t)ε , (2)
r (t) + δ = ε (t) κi (t)ε−1 , (3)
where κi (t) ≡ Ki (t) /Ni (t) is the capital intensity. The rental rate on each fac-
tor is the same for all firms, i.e. they all choose the same capital intensity and
κi (t) = κ (t) for all i = 1, . . . ,N . This is a very useful property of the model
because it enables us to aggregate the microeconomic relations to the macroeconomic
level.
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Generalizing the insights Romer (1989) to a growing population, we assume that
the inter-firm externality takes the following form:
(t) = 0 · κ (t)1−ε , (4)
where 0 is a positive constant, κ (t) ≡ K (t) /N (t) is the economy-wide capital
intensity, K (t) ≡ ∑i Ki (t) is the aggregate capital stock, and N (t) ≡
∑
i Ni (t) is
aggregate employment in efficiency units. According to Eq. 4, total factor productivity
depends positively on the aggregate capital intensity, i.e. if an individual firm i raises
its capital intensity, then all firms in the economy benefit somewhat as a result because
the general productivity indicator rises for all of them.
Using Eq. 4, Eqs. 1–3 can now be rewritten in aggregate terms:
Y (t) = 0 K (t) , (5)
w (t) N (t) = (1 − ε) Y (t) , (6)
r (t) = r = ε0 − δ, (7)
where Y (t) ≡ ∑i Yi (t) is aggregate output and we assume that capital is sufficiently
productive, i.e. r > π , where π is the rate of population growth (see below). The
aggregate technology is linear in the capital stock and the interest is constant.
2.2 Consumers
2.2.1 Individual behaviour
We develop the individual’s decision rules from the perspective of birth. Expected




C(v, τ )1−1/σ − 1
1 − 1/σ · e
−ρ(τ−v)−M(τ−v)dτ, (8)
where C (v, τ ) is consumption, σ is the intertemporal substitution elasticity (σ > 0), ρ
is the pure rate of time preference (ρ > 0), D is the maximum attainable age for the
agent, and e−M(τ−v) is the probability that the agent is still alive at some future time
τ(≥ v). Here, M(τ − v) ≡ ∫ τ−v0 μ(s)ds stands for the cumulative mortality rate and
μ (s) is the instantaneous mortality rate of an agent of age s.
The agent’s budget identity is given by:
A˙(v, τ ) = r A (τ − v) A(v, τ ) + w(v, τ)L (v, τ ) − C(v, τ )
+PR (v, τ ) + TR (v, τ ), (9)
where A (v, τ ) is the stock of financial assets, r A (τ − v) is the age-dependent annu-
ity rate of interest rate, w (v, τ) ≡ E (τ − v)w (τ) is the age-dependent wage rate,
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E (τ − v) is exogenous labour productivity, L (v, τ ) is labour supply, PR(v, τ ) are
payments received from the public pension system, and TR (v, τ ) are lump-sum trans-
fers (see below). Labour supply is exogenous and mandatory retirement takes place
at age R. Since the time endowment is unity, we thus find:
L (v, τ ) =
{
1 for 0 ≤ τ − v < R
0 for R ≤ τ − v < D . (10)
Along the balanced growth path, labour productivity grows at a constant exponential
rate, g (determined endogenously below), and as a result individual agents face the
following path for real wages during their active period (for 0 ≤ τ − v ≤ R):
w (v, τ) = w (v) E (τ − v) eg(τ−v). (11)
The wage is thus multiplicatively separable in vintage v and in age τ − v. The wage
at birth acts as an important initial condition facing an individual.
There is a simple PAYG pension system which taxes workers and provides benefits
to retirees:
PR (v, τ ) =
{−θw (v, τ ) for 0 ≤ τ − v < R
ζw (τ) for R ≤ τ − v < D (12)
where θ (0 < θ < 1) is the contribution rate and ζ is the benefit rate (ζ > 0). Under
a defined contribution (DC) system, θ is exogenous and ζ adjusts to balance the bud-
get (see below). The opposite holds under a defined benefit (DB) system. Finally, we
postulate that lump-sum transfers are age-independent:
TR (v, τ ) = z · w (τ), (13)
where z is endogenously determined via the balanced budget requirement of the redis-
tribution scheme (see below).
Like Yaari (1965). we postulate the existence of annuity markets, but unlike Yaari
we allow the annuities to be less than actuarially fair. Since the agent is subject to
lifetime uncertainty and has no bequest motive, he/she will fully annuitize so that the
annuity rate of interest facing the agent is given by:
r A (τ − v) ≡ r + λμ (τ − v) , (for 0 ≤ τ − v < D), (14)
where r is the real interest rate (see Eq. 7), and λ is a parameter (0 < λ ≤ 1). The case
of perfect, actuarially fair, annuities is obtained by setting λ = 1. One of the reasons
why λ may be strictly less than unity, however, is that annuity firms may possess
some market power allowing them to make a profit by offering a less than actuarially
fair annuity rate. We assume that the profits of annuity firms are taxed away by the
government and redistributed to households in a potentially age-dependent lump-sum
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fashion (see below). We shall refer to 1−λ as the degree of imperfection in the annuity
market.3
The agent chooses time profiles for C (v, τ ) and A (v, τ ) (for v ≤ τ ≤ v + D) in
order to maximize Eq. 8, subject to (i) the budget identity (Eq. 9), (ii) a NPG condi-
tion, limτ→∞ A (v, τ ) · e−r(τ−v)−λM(τ−v) = 0, and (iii) the initial asset position at
birth, A (v, v) = 0. The optimal consumption profile for a vintage-v individual of age
u(0 ≤ u ≤ D) is fully characterized by the following equations:











= (1 − θ)
R∫
0








The intuition behind these expressions is as follows. Equation 15 is best understood by
noting that the consumption Euler equation resulting from utility maximization takes
the following form:
C˙ (v, τ )
C (v, τ )
= σ · [r − ρ − (1 − λ)μ (τ − v)] . (18)
By using this expression, future consumption can be expressed in terms of consump-
tion at birth as in Eq. 15. In the absence of an annuity market imperfection (λ = 1),
consumption growth only depends on the gap between the interest rate and the pure
rate of time preference. In contrast, with imperfect annuities, individual consumption
growth is negatively affected by the mortality rate, a result first demonstrated for the
case with λ = 0 by Yaari (1965, p. 143).
Equation 16 shows that scaled consumption of a newborn is proportional to scaled
human wealth. Finally, Eq. 17 provides the definition of human wealth at birth. The first
term on the right-hand side represents the present value of the time endowment during
working life, using the growth-corrected annuity rate of interest for discounting. The
3 Another explanation for the overpricing of annuities is adverse selection (Finkelstein and Poterba 2002).
That is, agents with a low mortality rate are more likely to buy annuities than agents with high mortality
rates. However, because mortality is private information annuity firms “mis-price” annuities for low-mor-
tality agents, thus creating a load factor. Abel (1986) and Heijdra and Reijnders (2009) study this adverse
selection mechanism in a general equilibrium model featuring healthy and unhealthy people and with health
status constituting private information. The unhealthy get a less than actuarially fair annuity rate whilst the
healthy get a better than actuarially fair rate for part of life. An alternative source of imperfection may arise
from the way that the annuity market is structured. Yaari (1965) assumes that there is a continuous spot
market for annuities. In reality, however, investments in annuities are much lumpier. See Pissarides (1980)
for an early analysis of this issue.
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second term on the right-hand side denotes the present value of the pension received
during retirement. Finally, the third term on the right-hand side of Eq. 17 is just the
present value of transfers arising from the annuity market imperfection.
The asset profiles accompanying the optimal consumption plans are given for a
working-age individual (0 ≤ u < R) by:
A (v, v + u)
w (v)













and for a retiree (R ≤ u ≤ D) by:
A (v, v + u)
w (v)









2.2.2 Aggregate Household Behaviour
In this subsection we derive expressions for per-capita average consumption, labour
supply, and saving. As is shown in Heijdra and Romp (2008, p. 94), with age-depen-





p (v, t) ≡ P (v, t)
P (t)
≡ βe−π(t−v)−M(t−v), (22)
where β is the crude birth rate, π is the growth rate of the population, p (v, t) and
P (v, t) are, respectively, the relative and absolute size of cohort v at time t ≥ v, and
P (t) is the population size at time t . For a given birth rate, Eq. 21 determines the
unique population growth rate consistent with the demographic steady state or vice
versa. The average population-wide mortality rate, μ¯, follows residually from the fact
that π ≡ β − μ¯. Equation 22 shows the two reasons why the relative size of a cohort
falls over time, namely population growth and mortality.
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Using the cohort weights given in Eq. 22, we can define per-capita average values




p (v, t) X (v, t) dv, (23)
where X (v, t) denotes the variable in question at the individual level, and x (t) is
the per capita average value of that same variable. Per capita aggregate household
behaviour is summarized by the following expressions:
c (t)
w (t)





n (t) = n ≡ β
R∫
0
E (s) e−πs−M(s)ds, (25)























Equation 24 relates the macroeconomic consumption-wage ratio to the optimally cho-
sen scaled consumption level by newborns. Since this ratio is time-invariant, per capita
consumption grows at the macroeconomic growth rate g. Equation 25 shows that aggre-
gate per capita labour supply (in efficiency units) is a time-invariant constant. Finally,
the growth rate in per capita financial assets is given in Eq. 26. This expression will
be discussed in more detail below.
2.3 Loose Ends
We assume that the PAYG pension scheme is run on a balanced-budget basis. In view




βe−πs−M(s)ds = θw (t)
R∫
0
βE (s) e−πs−M(s)ds, (27)
where the left-hand side stands for pension payments to retirees and the right-hand
side represents pension contributions by workers. The mandatory retirement age R is
123
72 B. J. Heijdra, J. O. Mierau
exogenous. Under the assumption of a DC system, θ is also exogenous and ζ adjusts
to balance the budget. The opposite holds under a DB system. In view of Eq. 27, the
PAYG system does not feature in the expression for aggregate asset accumulation, i.e.
the second line of Eq. 26 is zero.
Excess profits of annuity firms can be written as follows:
EP (v, t) ≡ (1 − λ)
t∫
t−D
p (v, t) μ (t − v) A (v, t) dv. (28)
The integral on the right-hand side represents per capita annuitized assets of all indi-
viduals that die in period t . This is the total revenue of annuity firms, of which only a
fraction λ is paid out to surviving annuitants. The remaining fraction, 1 − λ, is excess
profit which is taxed away by the government and disbursed to all households in the
form of lump-sum transfers, i.e. EP (v, t) = TR (v, t). Using Eqs. 13 and 28 we find
the implied expression for z:




A (v, v + u)
w (v)
du. (29)
Just as for the PAYG system, the redistribution of excess profits of annuity firms also
debudget from the asset accumulation equation, i.e. the third line in Eq. 26 is also zero.
In the absence of government bonds, the capital market equilibrium condition is
given by A (t) = K (t) or, in per capita average terms, by:
a (t) = k (t), (30)
where k (t) ≡ K (t) /P (t) is the per capita stock of capital. From Eqs. 5 and 6 we
easily find:
y (t) = 0k (t) , (31)
w (t) n (t) = (1 − ε) y (t), (32)
where y (t) ≡ Y (t) /P (t) is per capita output. From Eqs. 26, 27, 29 and 30 we can
derive the expression for the macroeconomic growth rate:
g ≡ k˙ (t)
k (t)
= r − π +
[






For convenience, the key equations comprising the general equilibrium model have
been gathered in Table 1. Equations (T1.1)–(T1.2), (T1.3a)–(T1.3b), (T1.4)–(T1.6),
(T1.8)–(T1.9) restate, respectively, Eqs. 16–17, 19–20, 24, 25, 27, 29, and 33. Equation
(T1.7) is obtained by combining Eqs. 31 and 32 and noting Eq. 25.
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+ z ∫ D0 e−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds (T1.2)
A(v,v+u)
w(v)














− (ζ + z) ∫ Du e−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds (T1.3b)
(b) Macroeconomic relationships:








z = (1 − λ) ∫ D0 βe−(g+π)u−M(u)μ (u) A(v,v+u)w(v) du (T1.5)








k(t) = (1 − ε)0 (T1.7)
n = β ∫ R0 E (s) e−πs−M(s)ds (T1.8)
c(t)




Definitions: Endogenous are C(v, v)/w(v), H(v, v)/w(v), A(v, v + u)/w(v), ζ, z, g, n, w(t)/k(t), and
c(t)/w(t). Parameters: R retirement age, θ pension contribution rate, birth rate β, aggregate mortality rate
μ¯, population growth rate π ≡ β−μ¯, imperfection annuities λ, rate of time preference ρ, capital coefficient
in the technology ε, scale factor in the technology 0. The interest rate is r ≡ ε0 − δ, where δ is the
depreciation rate of capital
The model features a two-way interaction between the microeconomic decisions
and the macroeconomic outcomes. Indeed, conditional on the macroeconomic vari-
ables, equations (T1.1)–(T1.3) determine scaled newborn consumption and human
wealth, C (v, v) /w (v) and H (v, v) /w (v) as well as the age profile of scaled assets
A (v, v + u) /w (v). Conditional on these microeconomic variables, equations (T1.4)–
(T1.9) determine equilibrium pension payments and transfers, ζ and z, the macroeco-
nomic growth rate, g, the overall wage-capital ratio, w (t) /k (t), aggregate labour
supply, n, and the c (t) /w (t) ratio.
2.4 Adding Empirical Content
An important virtue of the analytical approach adopted here is that it allows one to
pinpoint the various places where life-cycle elements affect individual choices and
aggregate outcomes. The model contains three main mechanisms giving rise to life-
cycle effects. First, the mortality process is age-dependent, i.e. the instantaneous and
cumulative hazard rates (μ (u) and M (u)) both depend on age. Second, labour produc-
tivity (E (u)) depends on the worker’s age. Third, the pension system and mandatory
retirement age differentiates workers from retirees. In the remainder of this section
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we add empirical content to the model by plausibly calibrating the various life-cycle
mechanisms.
To capture the demographic process we use the model suggested by Boucekkine
et al. (2002), which incorporates a finite maximum age. The surviving fraction up to
age u (from the perspective of birth) is given by:
e−M(u) ≡ η0 − e
η1u
η0 − 1 , (34)
with η0 > 1 and η1 > 0. For this demographic process, D = (1/η1) ln η0 is the
maximum attainable age, whilst the instantaneous mortality rate at age u is given by:
μ (u) ≡ η1e
η1u
η0 − eη1u . (35)
The mortality rate is increasing in age and becomes infinite at u = D.
In Heijdra and Mierau (2010) we use data from age 18 onward for the Dutch cohort
that was born in 1960. We denote the actual surviving fraction up until model age ui
by Si , and estimate the parameters of the parametric distribution function by means
of non-linear least squares. The model to be estimated is thus:
Si = 1 − (ui ) + εi = d (ui ≤ D) · η0 − e
η1ui
η0 − 1 + εi , (36)
where d (ui ≤ D) = 1 for ui ≤ D, and d (ui ≤ D) = 0 for ui > D, and εi is the
stochastic error term. We find the following estimates (with t statistics in brackets):
ηˆ0 = 122.643(11.14), ηˆ1 = 0.0680(48.51). The standard error of the regression is
σˆ = 0.02241, and the implied estimate for D is 70.75 model years (i.e. the maximum
age in biological years is 88.75). Figure 1a depicts the actual and fitted survival rates
with, respectively, solid and dashed lines. Up to age 69, the model fits the data rather
well. For higher ages the fit deteriorates as the estimated model fails to capture the fact
that some people are expected to live very long lives in reality. Figure 1b depicts the
implieds instantaneous mortality rate. Mortality is very low and virtually constant up
to model age u = 50 (corresponding with biological age 68) but rises at an increasing
rate thereafter. Finally, Fig. 1c shows the implied relative cohort sizes.
Several studies have argued that labour productivity is hump-shaped—see for exam-
ple Hansen (1993) and Ríos-Rull (1996).4 An analytically convenient age profile for
productivity involves exponential terms:
E (u) = α0e−ζ0u − α1e−ζ1u, (37)
where E (u) is labour productivity of a u-year old worker, and we assume that α0 >
α1 > 0, ζ1 > ζ0 > 0, and α1ζ1 > α0ζ0. We easily find that E (u) ≥ 0, E (0) =
4 The relationship between age and worker productivity is studied in a number of recent papers by Lallemand
and Rycx (2009) and van Ours (2009).
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(b)(a)



















































Fig. 1 Life-cycle features. Notes: u is the agent’s age, β is the crude birth rate, π is the population growth
rate, M(u) is the cumulative mortality factor, μ(u) is the instantaneous mortality rate, and E(u) is labour
productivity at age u. The maximum attainable age estimated with Dutch data is D = 70.75
α0 − α1 > 0, limu→∞ E (u) = 0, E ′ (u) > 0 (for 0 ≤ u < u¯) and E ′ (u) < 0 (for
u ≥ u¯) where the peak occurs at age u¯:
u¯ = 1






Labour productivity is non-negative throughout life, starts out positive, is rising during
the first life phase, and declines thereafter. Using cross-section efficiency data for male
workers aged between 18 and 70 from Hansen (1993, p. 74) we find the solid pattern
in Fig. 1d. We interpolate these data by fitting equation (Eq. 37) using non-linear
least squares. We find the following estimates (t statistics in brackets): α0 = 4.494
(fixed), αˆ1 = 4.010 (71.04), ζˆ0 = 0.0231(24.20), and ζˆ1 = 0.050(17.81). The fitted
productivity profile is illustrated with dashed lines in Fig. 1d.
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Finally, for the third life-cycle feature—the PAYG pension system—we assume
that the mandatory retirement age is set at R = 47 (corresponding with 65 in bio-
logical years) and that the pension contribution rate is seven percent of wage income,
i.e. θ = 0.07 which roughly corresponds with the Dutch pension system. The implied
pension benefit is determined in general equilibrium.
The remainder of the core model is parameterized as follows. We postulate the
existence of perfect annuities (PA, with λ = 1). We assume that the rate of population
growth is half of one percent per annum (π = 0.005). For the estimated demographic
process, Eq. 21 yields a steady-state birth rate equal to β = 0.0204. Since μ¯ ≡ β −π ,
this implies that the average mortality rate is μ¯ = 0.0154. The old-age dependency
ratio equals 22.92%. We model an economy with a steady-state capital-output ratio of
2.5, which is obtained by setting 0 = 0.4. The interest rate is five percent per annum
(r = 0.05), the capital depreciation rate is seven percent per annum (δ = 0.07), and
the efficiency parameter of capital is set at ε = 0.3. The steady-state growth rate is
set equal to two percent per annum (g = 0.02). For the intertemporal substitution
elasticity we use σ = 0.7, a value consistent with the estimates reported by Attanasio
and Weber (1995). The rate of pure time preference is used as a calibration parameter,
yielding a value of ρ = 0.0112.
Table 2(a) reports the main features of the initial steady-state growth path. With
perfect annuities, there are no excess profits of annuity firms and thus no transfers,
i.e. z = 0 in Table 2(a). Note also that at retirement age R a vintage-v agent receives
ζw (v + R) in the form of a pension whereas the last-received wage for this agent
equals E (R) w (v + R). The replacement rate is thus equal to ζ/E (R) = 0.3189.
We visualize the life-cycle profiles for a number a key variables in Fig. 2. The
solid lines are associated with the core model featuring perfect annuities. For ease
of interpretation, the horizontal axes report biological age, u + 18. Figure 2a shows
that with perfect longevity insurance consumption rises monotonically over the life
cycle. This counterfactual result follows readily from Eq. 18 which for λ = 1 simpli-
fies to C˙ (v, τ ) /C (v, τ ) = σ (r − ρ). Figure 2b depicts the age profile of scaled
financial assets. At first the agent is a net borrower, i.e. a buyer of life-insured
loans. Thereafter annuity purchases are positive and the profile of assets is bell-
shaped. In the absence of a bequest motive, the agent plans to run out of finan-
cial assets at the maximum age D. Figure 2c shows the profile of scaled wages
over the life cycle. Despite the fact that individual labour productivity itself is bell-
shaped (see Fig. 1d), wages increase monotonically as a result of ongoing economic
growth. Finally, in Fig. 2d we illustrate the profile for scaled pension receipts. During
the working career these payments are negative and proportional to scaled wages,
whilst they are positive and proportional to the economy-wide wage rate during
retirement.
Despite its simplicity the model captures some of the main stylized facts regarding
life cycles. Indeed, as is documented by inter alia Huggett (1996), in real life financial
assets typically display a hump-shaped profile and remain non-negative in old age. The
model also features a realistic age profile for labour supply. Indeed, as is pointed out
by McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) (for the United States), labour supply is constant
and age-invariant for most of working life and tapers off rapidly near the retirement
age.
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Table 2 Quantitative effects
Case Core cases DC DB RA
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
PA IA PA IA PA IA PA IA
C (v, v)
w (v)
0.8534 0.8609 1.0784 1.0785 0.9078 0.9053 0.9329 0.9369
H (v, v)
w (v)
26.5646 27.0207 36.0229 36.2942 30.3246 30.4653 31.1617 31.5282
g (%) 2.00 1.91 3.36 3.27 2.79 2.68 2.39 2.30
n 0.9675 0.9675 0.8212 0.8212 0.8212 0.8212 0.9589 0.9589
w (t)
k (t)
0.2894 0.2894 0.3410 0.3410 0.3410 0.3410 0.2920 0.2920
c (t)
w (t)
1.0538 1.0570 0.8692 0.8720 0.8861 0.8893 1.0482 1.0514
ζ 0.3632 0.3632 0.1824 0.1824 0.3632 0.3632 0.3632 0.3632
z 0.0200 0.0142 0.0131 0.0185
θ 0.1394 0.1394
R + 18 75.3 75.3
Notes: PA stands for perfect annuities (λ = 1) and IA denotes imperfect annuities (λ = 0.7). Column
(a) is the core model. Column (b) shows the effects of the annuity market imperfection in the core model.
Columns (c)–(d) show the effects of a demographic shock under a DC pension system. Columns (e)–(f)
show the effects under a DB system. In this scenario the tax rate θ adjusts to keep ζ at its pre-shock level.
Columns (g)–(h) show the effects under a retirement age (RA) scenario in which θ and ζ are kept at their
pre-shock levels and R is adjusted
In contrast, the model does not provide a realistic profile for consumption. In the
core model the age profile for consumption is monotonically increasing, whereas
it is hump-shaped in reality. See for example, Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and
Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) for evidence on the US, and Alessie and de
Alessie and de Ree (2009) for a recent study using Dutch data.
Referring to the consumption Euler equation (Eq. 18) it is clear that an annuity
market imperfection can account for a hump-shaped pattern of consumption. Indeed,
with 0 < λ < 1 it follows from Eq. 18 and Fig. 1b that consumption growth is
positive during the early phase of life because the mortality rate is low, i.e. r − ρ >
(1 − λ)μ (u). Toward the end of life, however, the instantaneous death probability
rises sharply, the inequality is reversed, and the optimal consumption profile is down-
ward sloping.5
In order to quantify and visualize the effects of an annuity market imperfection
we recompute the general equilibrium of the model using the structural parameters
mentioned above but setting λ = 0.7. This degree of annuity market imperfection
is in the order of magnitude found by Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, p. 59).
5 Consumption peaks at age uˆ, which is defined implicitly by μ(uˆ) = (r − ρ) / (1 − λ). Since μ′ (u) > 0
we find that dμˆ/dλ > 0 and dμˆ/d (r − ρ) > 0. Hence, the smaller is λ or r − ρ, the lower is the age at
which consumption peaks. Note that whereas λ can help determine the location of the kink, the intertemporal
substitution elasticity σ cannot do so.
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Fig. 2 Life-cycle profiles and the role of annuity imperfections
Table 2(b) reports the quantitative implications of the annuity market imperfection.
Two features stand out. First, in the presence of imperfect annuities excess profits of
annuity firms are positive and transfers are thus strictly positive (z = 0.0200). Each
surviving agent thus receives about two percent of the macroeconomic wage rate in
each period in the form of transfers. Second, the macroeconomic growth rate falls by
nine basis points, from 2 percent to 1.91 percent per annum.
The ultimate effect on newborn consumption of the change in λ depends on the
interplay between the human wealth effect and the propensity effect. Recall from
(T1.1)–(T1.2) that C (v, v) =  · H (v, v) where the propensity to consume is defined
as:
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It is easy to show that with 0 < σ < 1, the propensity to consume out of human wealth
falls as a result of the reduction in λ:
d
dλ
= (1 − σ)2 ·
D∫
0
M (s) e−(1−σ)[rs+λM(s)]−σ [ρs+M(s)]ds > 0. (40)





= − (1 − θ)
R∫
0








M (s) e−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds < 0. (41)
A decrease in λ results in a reduction in the annuity rate of interest at all age levels
and thus an increase in human wealth due to less severe discounting of non-asset
income streams. Human wealth is also affected by two of the macroeconomic vari-
ables, namely transfers z and the growth rate g (note that n, ζ , and w (t) /k (t) are not








e−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds > 0, (42)





= (1 − θ)
R∫
0







se−(r−g)s−λM(s)ds > 0. (43)
The results in Table 2(b) confirm that for our parameterization scaled consump-
tion and human wealth both increase, i.e. the effects in Eqs. 41 and 42 dominate the
combined propensity effect (Eq. 40) and growth effect (Eq. 43).
In Fig. 2 the dashed lines depict the life-cycle profiles associated with the model fea-
turing imperfect annuities. Scaled consumption is hump-shaped but peaks at a rather
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high age.6 The profiles for scaled financial assets, wages, and pension payments are
all very similar to the ones for the core model.7
3 Ageing: The Big Picture
In this section we put our model to work on the big policy issue of demographic
change. Population ageing remains one of the key issues in economic policy in the
Netherlands. During the 2010 Dutch parliamentary election campaign numerous par-
ties went so far as to call future policy on pensions and the retirement age a breaking
point for the post-electoral coalition scramble. In this section we look at the big pic-
ture and study the effect of ageing and demographic change on the steady-state rate
of economic growth of a country.8
We start our analysis with some stylized facts for the Netherlands.9 In the period
2005–2010 the crude birth rate is about β = 1.13% per annum whereas for 2035–
2040 it is projected to change to β = 1.05% per annum. The population growth
rates are, respectively, π = 0.41% per annum for 2005–2010 and π = −0.01%
per annum 2035–2040. Finally, the old-age dependency ratio is, respectively 23% in
2010 and 46% in 2040. We wish to simulate our model using a demographic shock
which captures the salient features of these stylized facts. Since we restrict attention
to steady-state comparisons in this paper, we make the strong assumption that the
country finds itself in a demographic steady state both at present and in 2040.
3.1 A Demographic Shock
The demographic shock that we study is as follows. First, we assume that the pop-
ulation growth rate changes from π0 = 0.5% to π1 = 0% per annum. Second,
we use our estimated demographic process (Eq. 34) but change the η1 parameter in
such a way that an old-age dependency ratio of 46% is obtained. Writing e−Mi (u) ≡(


















6 Bütler (2001) and Hansen and ˙Imrohorogˇlu (2008) also find that the hump occurs too late in life. Alessie
and de Ree (2009, p. 113) decompose Dutch consumption into durables and non-durables. They find that
non-durable consumption peaks at age 45 whereas durable consumption reaches its maximum at about
age 41.
7 We study the consequences of annuitization for economic growth and individual welfare in Heijdra and
Mierau (2009, 2010) and Heijdra et al. (2010). The latter paper demonstrates the existence of a “tragedy of
annuitization”. Although full annuitization of assets is privately optimal it may not be socially beneficial
due to adverse general equilibrium repercussions.
8 For an accessible survey of the literature on the topic of population ageing and economic growth, see
Bloom et al. (2008). Recent contributions using the endogenous growth framework include Fougère and
Mérette (1999), Futagami and Nakajima (2001), Heijdra and Romp (2006) and Prettner (2009).
9 These figures are taken from United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision Population
Data Base,http://esa.un.org/unpp. We use data for the medium variant.
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ln η0. Using this expression we find that η1 changes from η1,0 =
ηˆ1 = 0.0680 to η1,1 = 0.0581. The associated values for the crude birth rate are by
imposing the suitably modified demographic steady-state condition (Eq. 21). We find
that β changes in the model from β0 = 0.0204 to β1 = 0.0151. Figure 1b shows
that the new instantaneous mortality profile shifts to the right. Figure 1c illustrates the
change in the population composition. In the new steady state, the population distri-
bution features less mass at lower ages and more at higher ages, i.e. the population
pyramid becomes narrower and higher.
The effect on the economic growth rate of the demographic shock depends criti-
cally on the type of pension system. We consider three scenarios. In the first scenario
the pension system is DC, the contribution rate and retirement age are kept constant
(θ0 = 0.07 and R0 = 47), pension payments to the elderly are reduced to balance
the budget of the PAYG system. Columns (c)–(d) in Table 2 report the results for the
two cases with perfect (PA) and imperfect annuities (PA). Since the effects are qual-
itatively the same for PA and IA, we restrict attention to the latter case. Comparing
columns (b) and (d) several features stand out. First, the ageing shock has a large
effect on the supply of (efficiency units of) labour, i.e. n falls by more than fifteen
percent. This is an obvious consequence of the fact that the population proportion of
working-age persons declines (see Fig. 1d). Second, the pension payments to retirees
are almost halved. Third, notwithstanding the decrease in pensions, scaled consump-
tion and human wealth at birth both increase dramatically. More people expect to
survive into retirement and, once retired, the period of retirement is also increased.
Fourth, the macroeconomic growth rate increases dramatically, from 1.91 to 3.27%
per annum. The intuition behind this strong growth effect can be explained with the
aid of Fig. 3. The solid lines represents the core case of Table 2(b) and the dashed
lines illustrate the results from Table 2(d). Following the demographic shock scaled
consumption is uniformly higher and peaks at a later age. Scaled financial assets are
somewhat lower during youth but much higher thereafter. As Fig. 3b shows there is a
huge savings response which explains the large increase in the macroeconomic growth
rate. In conclusion, of the main growth channels identified by Bloom et al. (2008, p. 2),
labour supply falls (and thus retards growth) but the capital accumulation effect is so
strong as to lead to a strong positive effect of longevity on economic growth.
In the second scenario the pension system is DB, the pension payments and retire-
ment age are kept constant (ζ0 = 0.3632 and R0 = 47), and pension contributions by
the young are increased to balance the budget of the PAYG system. Columns (e)–(f) in
Table 2 give the results for this case. Comparing columns (b), (d) and (f) the following
features stand out. First, the contribution rate increased is quite substantial, it almost
doubles from θ0 = 0.07 to θ1 = 0.1394. Second, though scaled consumption, scaled
human wealth, and the economic growth rate are higher than in the base case, they are
lower than under the DC scenario. As Fig. 3 shows, the capital accumulation effect
of the longevity shock is substantially dampened under a DB system. Intuitively, by
taking from the young and giving to the old the PAYG system redistributes from net
savers to net dissavers.
Finally, in the third scenario both θ and ζ are kept at their pre-shock levels and
the retirement age is increased to balance the budget of the PAYG system. Columns
(g)–(h) in Table 2 give the results for this case. Comparing columns (b), (d), (f), and
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scaled financial assets(b)scaled consumption(a)
C (v, v + u)
w(v)
A (v, v + u)
w(v)



























Fig. 3 Life-cycle profiles before and after the demographic shock
(h) the following features stand out. First, under the retirement age (RA) scenario the
longevity shock necessitates an increase in the biological retirement age 65 to 75.3
years. i.e. the value of R restoring budget balance changes from R0 = 47 to R1 = 57.3.
Second, compared to the DB and DC cases, labour supply increases strongly in the RA
scenario. Third, the economic growth rate, though still higher than in the base case,
is slightly lower that under DB and much lower than under DC. The intuition behind
this result is clear from Fig. 3b which shows that the savings response following the
longevity shock is lower than either DB or DC.
3.2 Robustness
The clear message emerging from the discussion so far is that the type of pension
system in place has a quantitatively large influence on the link between longevity and
macroeconomic growth. Indeed, the same longevity shock can either lead to a huge
increase in growth (under DC) or only a modest increase (under RA). But how robust
are these conclusions? As is pointed out by Bloom et al. (2008, p. 3), “population data
are not sacrosanct” and UN predictions are revised substantially over time. In short,
our stylized demographic facts may be more like “factoids”.10
We study the robustness issue in Table 3. We restrict attention to the case with
imperfect annuities, and column (a) in the table represents the base case. It coincides
with the pre-shock steady state reported in Table 2(b). Columns (b)–(c) in Table 3
report the results under the DC scenario for alternative demographic shocks. In con-
trast, columns (d)–(e) show how a much more broadly defined PAYG system reacts to
the original demographic shock under DC, DB, and RA.
10 De Waegenaere et al. (2010) provide a survey of the recent literature on longevity risk (i.e. the risk that
mortality predictions turn out to be wrong). In accordance with Bloom et al. (2008) they show that estimates
on future mortality rates differ substantially and depend on a plethora of uncertain factors.
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Table 3 Alternative scenarios
Initial PAYG system Large PAYG system
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
DC DC DC DB RA
C (v, v)
w (v)
0.8609 0.9268 1.0971 0.7047 0.8818 0.6109 0.7678
H (v, v)
w (v)
27.0207 29.4510 38.0243 22.1187 29.6744 20.5594 25.8384
g (%) 1.91 2.33 3.43 1.19 2.59 1.51 1.71
n 0.9675 0.9217 0.8155 0.9675 0.8212 0.8212 0.9589
w (t)
k (t)
0.2894 0.3038 0.3434 0.2894 0.3410 0.3410 0.2920
c (t)
w (t)
1.0570 1.0094 0.8465 1.0817 0.8918 0.9236 1.0715
ζ 0.3632 0.2796 0.1812 0.7783 0.3910 0.7783 0.7783
z 0.0200 0.0200 0.0111 0.0174 0.0130 0.0120 0.0148
θ 0.2986
R + 18 75.3
Notes: Column (a) is the core model with imperfect annuities (column (b) in Table 2). Column (b) depen-
dency ratio in 2040 equal to 30% instead of 46%. Column (c) population growth rate in 2040 equal to 0.5%
instead of 0% per annum. Column (d) bigger PAYG system (θ = 0.15). Columns (e)–(f) show the effects
of the original demographic shock for the large PAYG system under DC and DB. Column (g) leaves θ and
ζ unchanged and features a higher retirement age
In column (b) we assume that the old-age dependency ratio is 30% rather than 46%
in 2040. As in the original shock we continue to assume that π1 = 0% per annum. By
using Eq. 44 we obtain new values for the demographic parameters, i.e. η1,1 = 0.0662
and β1 = μ¯1 = 0.0172. The alternative demographic shock causes a small increase
in the economic growth rate. Whereas the original demographic shock caused growth
to increase from 1.91 to 3.27% per annum (see Table 2, columns (b) and (d)), the
alternative one only raises the growth rate to 2.33% per annum. The alternative age-
ing shock is relatively small, and pensions are reduced much less drastically than
under the original demographic shock. The private savings response is quite small as
a result.
In column (c) we keep the dependency ratio at 46% but assume that the population
growth rate is 0.5% rather than 0% per annum in 2040. Under this assumption the demo-
graphic parameters are equal to η1,1 = 0.0540, β1 = 0.0168, and μ¯1 = 0.0118. This
type of demographic shock produces a huge increase in the macroeconomic growth
rate. The intuition is the same as before—see the discussion relating to Table 2(d)
above. The large growth effect is all the more surprising in view of the growth equa-
tion (T1.6) which directly features −π on the right-hand side. So even though the
demographic shock itself retards growth by 0.5% per annum, the huge private savings
response more than compensates for this effect.
In conclusion, the two alternative demographic shocks give rise to qualitatively the
same predictions as we obtained for the original shock. Under a DC system economic
growth is boosted because the labour supply effect is strongly dominated by the capital
accumulation effect.
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As a final robustness check we investigate whether the size of the PAYG system
influences the relationship between longevity and economic growth. We return to the
original demographic shock featuring π1 = 0.05% per annum and an old-age depen-
dency ratio of 46% (η1,1 = 0.0581 and β1 = 0.0151). As was pointed out by Broer
(2001, p. 89), “in an ageing society, both the health insurance system and the pension
system impose an increasing burden on households. … Thus as the share of elderly
in the population grows, the contribution base [of the public health insurance system,
HM] shrinks at the same time when demand for health care increases.” In short, it
can be argued that the public health insurance system itself contains elements of a
PAYG type, i.e. it taxes the young (and healthy) and provides resources to the old (and
infirm).
Whereas it is beyond the scope of the present paper to fully model the health insur-
ance system, we take from Broer’s analysis the idea that the PAYG system may be
broader than just the public pension system itself. We study the quantitative conse-
quences of PAYG system size in columns (d)–(g) in Table 3. Column (d) shows what
happens to the initial steady-state economy if the contribution rate is increased from
θ0 = 0.07 to θ1 = 0.15. The comparison between columns (a) and (d) reveals that
there is a huge drop in the growth rate, from g = 1.91% to g = 1.19% per annum.
Intuitively the larger PAYG system takes more from the young and gives more to the
old. This chokes off private savings and retards economic growth.
Columns (e)–(g) in Table 3 shows the effects of the original demographic shock
under DC, DB, and RA. The growth increases under all scenarios with the largest effect
occurring under the DC system. Interestingly, whereas the growth effect was smallest
for the RA case in the original model with the narrowly defined PAYG system, for a
large PAYG system it is smallest for the DB scenario.
3.3 Limitations
A few words of caution are in place when interpreting our conclusions. There are
several limitations. First, our analysis consists of steady-state comparisons and space
considerations prevent us from studying the transitional dynamics of a longevity shock.
Although we find that in the steady state a longevity shock has beneficial effects on
growth, it need not be the case that transition is monotonic. Second, we have merely
analyzed growth but not individual welfare. However, as we assume exogenous labour
supply higher growth automatically translates into higher welfare because discounted
income of individuals increases. Third, we have assumed that labour supply and the
retirement age are exogenous. We have chosen this approach here in order to keep the
model as simple as possible. Indeed, endogenization of both the hours decision over
the life cycle and/or the retirement date is fairly straightforward—see e.g. Heijdra and
Romp (2009) and Heijdra and Mierau (2009, 2010). Fourth, we have ignored aggre-
gate risk and the risk-sharing properties of pension systems. The interested reader is
referred to Bovenberg and Uhlig (2008) who apply a two-period stochastic overlapping
generations model featuring endogenous growth to study the consequences of partic-
ular pension systems on risk-sharing between generations. Finally, we have studied a
closed economy. This is not a convincing representation of the Dutch economy which is
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extremely open and small in world markets. However, aging is a global phenomenon.
Hence, to model a small open economy with fixed factor prices is equally uncon-
vincing. Here we have chosen the closed economy framework to zoom in on the
global consequences of ageing on capital accumulation and economic growth—the
big picture.
4 Conclusions
We develop a macroeconomic model that is firmly grounded in the microeconomic
environment of the individual. In contrast to the highly stylized models in the tradition
of Blanchard (1985) we are able to replicate individual profiles for both consumption
and savings. In addition, and in contrast to the very detailed computable general equi-
librium models, we are still able to clearly analyze the mechanisms that are at play in
the interaction between microeconomic behaviour and macroeconomic outcomes.
For the purpose at hand we have kept the model as simple as possible. The model,
however, is very flexible in its very nature. In earlier work we have used a more elab-
orate version of the model to study issues relating to capital market imperfections
(Heijdra and Mierau 2009) and taxation issues (Heijdra and Mierau 2010). In future
work we seek to further study the nebulous relationship between aging and economic
growth in a model where also the labour market participation decision (concerning
entry and retirement) is made endogenous.
With the current version of the model we study the relationship between aging and
economic growth and the mediating role that government policy has on this relation-
ship. We find that, in principle, aging increases the economic growth rate. However,
if a defined benefit system is in place the growth effect weakens somewhat because
of the increase in the contribution rate necessary to finance the additional pensioners.
In order to circumvent this adverse effect on the growth rate the government might
consider to switch to a defined contribution system or to increase the retirement age.
Surprisingly, we find that the latter policy option has adverse effects on the economy.
This is due to a weaker savings reaction to the shortened retirement horizon.
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